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DE RE AND DE DICTO
Robert E. Jodes,Jr.*
I will begin this account with a dozen cases, real, hypothetical, or
in between. They cover a broad range of topics, and their relation to
one another is far from obvious. They have in common, though, a
certain kind of puzzlement. Each case presents a question for decision, with arguments on both sides, but we have a certain feeling that
the two sets of arguments are not addressing the same question. Each
set seems totally plausible on the question it is addressing, but we are
not quite sure that that question is the real one. I propose to show
that all these cases involve legal rules with the same built-in ambiguity.
As the ambiguity relates to alternative logical forms, no logical analysis
can resolve it.But once it is brought into the open, we can see that
either alternative is consistent with the logical structure of the rule we
are applying. We are therefore free to decide the cases by looking to
considerations outside the rules.
Here, then, are the cases:
1. In 1970, David Smith became the tenant of a flat on the
ground floor of a house in London. He put in new flooring, wall
panels, and wiring for a stereo set. When he left, he removed some of
the flooring and wall panels so he could take the wiring with him. He
did not know that under the traditional law of fixtures they had all
become the property of the landlord. He was tried under a statute
making it an offense intentionally to destroy or damage someone
else's property. His defense was that he thought it was his own property. The trial court convicted him, saying that the material was the
landlord's and Smith had intentionally damaged it. But the Court of
Appeal reversed, saying that the intention must apply to the ownership as well as to the damage. 1
2. In February, 1983, Lubelyn Caddali, a citizen of the Philippines, entered the United States as the fianc&e of a man whom she
intended to marry upon her arrival. Unfortunately, he had been murdered a few days before. Instead of a marriage, she attended his fu*
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neral. She remained in the United States, however, and the status of

her original entry did not become an issue until the INS brought deportation proceedings a few years later. At that time, the INS argued
that she could not have entered the United States for the purpose of
marrying her fianc6 because he was dead. She argued that she did
not know he was dead, so her purpose at the time she entered was the
2
same as it had been when she set out.

3. A federal statute imposes fine or imprisonment on anyone who
"knowingly" violates a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding the transportation of corrosive substances. A trucker
carried sulfuric acid and other corrosives without the shipping documents required by such a regulation. The trucker knew he was carrying the acid, and knew what documents he had and had not. But he
did not know of the regulation. He claimed he could not knowingly
violate a regulation he did not know existed. The government argued
3
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
4. In Screws v. United States,4 defendant police officers were con-

victed under the federal Civil Rights Act for willfully violating rights
protected by the federal Constitution. They objected that the statute
under which they were convicted was too vague. No one but a constitutional scholar with an up-to-date copy of the United States Reports
can know which rights are and are not protected by the Constitution.
But the Court limited the statute to cases where the accused knew that
they were violating a constitutional right. These defendants, who had
beaten a theft suspect to death, cannot have failed to realize that the
Constitution forbade what they were doing.
5. In the case of Regina v. Chapman,5 the accused ran off with a
sixteen-year-old girl who became his mistress. He was tried under a
statute that made it a crime to take a girl under eighteen away from
her home for the purpose of having unlawful sexual intercourse. He
argued that with the repeal of the laws against fornication with girls
between sixteen and eighteen, the intercourse he intended the girl to
have was not unlawful. The court rejected that argument and construed "unlawful" in the applicable statute to mean the same as "nonmarital."
6. Indiana Code 35-44-3-4(3) makes it a crime to alter, damage, or
remove "any record, document, or thing, with intent to prevent it
2 See Caddali v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 975 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.
1992).
3 See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558

(1971).
4
5

325 U.S. 91 (1945).
[1958] 3 All E.R. 143 (C.A.).
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from being produced or used as evidence in any official proceeding
or investigation." Your client has some letters in his files that might
indicate that he has violated the antitrust laws, although no one has
yet accused him of doing so. Should you advise him to bum the
letters?
7. The police catch a thief with stolen goods. With the owner's
permission, they send the thief to fence the goods, hoping to catch
the fence. They are successful, and Jaffe, the fence, is tried for attempting to purchase stolen goods. But he argues that the goods he
attempted to purchase were not stolen: they were being used with the
permission of the owner.6
8. A pickpocket is caught with his hand in an empty pocket, and
is accused of attempted theft. He denies that he attempted to steal
anything.
9. Smith allows a six-year-old child to play with a live hand grenade. The child drops it on his foot and breaks a toe. The parents
sue Smith, contending that he created an unreasonable risk of harm
to the child, and that harm ensued. He points out that the harm that
ensued was not the one unreasonably risked. The hand grenade is no
heavier than a book, a pop bottle, or a toy truck, any of which the
child might have played with and dropped without causing tort
liability.
10. Richard Clarke enters a dark bedroom, and climbs into bed
with Jane, who thinks he is her husband, John, and permits him to
have sexual intercourse with her. When she discovers her mistake, he
runs away, and when caught is prosecuted for rape. The prosecution
contends that Jane did not consent to have intercourse with Richard.
The defense contends that he did not have intercourse with her with7
out her consent.
11. In 1894, Pope Leo XIII ruled that Anglican clergy after the
Reformation were not validly ordained. Since the authors of the Book
of Common Prayer did not believe in the sacrifice of the Mass, they
eliminated all reference to it from their ordination rite. Thus, in ordaining according to this rite, they cannot have intended to do what
the church does-which is the intention required for the validity of a
sacrament. The Anglicans responded by referring to the Preface to
the Ordination rite, which expressed an intention to continue the

6
7

See People v. Jaffe, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906).
See Regina v. Clarke, 169 Eng. Rep. 779 (Crim. App. 1854).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 73:3

three orders of bishop, priest, and deacon as they had always been in
the church. 8
12. Joe, a disreputable Talmudic scholar and undutiful son, tells
his parents that whatever of his property is available for their support
is dedicated to the Temple. Since anything the owner says is dedicated to the Temple is thereby so dedicated, and since nothing dedicated to the Temple is available to support his parents, Joe has freed
himself from any obligation to support them. Furthermore, since he
dedicated nothing to the Temple except what was available for parental support, i.e., nothing at all, he has no obligation to the Temple
either. A number of rabbis evidently believed that this reasoning,
however reprehensible, was logically inescapable. Jesus, however, condemned it.9
My claim here is that the rule of law involved in each of these
cases can be expressed in either of two alternative logical forms-the
same two in every case-that logic offers no basis for deciding which
form should be preferred, and that the way is accordingly open to
choose the form that best serves our policy in the particular case.
Before we get to the cases, I will illustrate the alternatives with a
simple non-legal paradigm. Assume a big trial is about to begin. Sam,
lead counsel for the plaintiff, comes down to breakfast wearing a necktie with a spot on it. Susie, his wife, tells him his necktie has a spot, so
he goes and changes it. As he is going out the door, she asks him,
"Did you really intend to go to court wearing a necktie with a spot?"
"Of course not," he says.
"But you would have if I hadn't stopped you," she points out.
Assume that wearing a soiled necktie to court is forbidden, not by
a court rule, but by a principle of effective advocacy. Did Sam intend
to violate that rule? Not really, because he did not know there was a
spot on his tie. On the other hand, whatever unfavorable impression
the tie would have made on the judge and jury would in fact have
been made if Susie had not gotten him to change it.
So was Sam guilty of disrespect for the court? No. Would he, but
for Susie's intervention, have incurred the consequence of impaired
forensic effectiveness? Yes. Was he guilty of sartorial carelessness?
Probably. Which of these questions we want to answer will affect the
way we describe the incident. If we want to stress Sam's carelessness
and the bad effect on his advocacy, we will point out that he had put
8 There is an extensive literature on the question of Anglican orders. ANTHONY
A. STEPHENSON, ANGLICAN ORDERs (1956) assembles the arguments as well as any.
9

See Matthew 15:3-6; Mark 7:9-12.
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on a necktie with a spot, and that he had every intention of going to
court without changing it. On the other hand, if we want to stress the
fact that he meant no disrespect for the court, we will point out that
his standing in front of the court with a spotted necktie was not something that he wanted to make happen. So Susie's question whether he
intended to go to court wearing a spotted necktie can be put in either
of two ways, and answered accordingly:
One: Was there a necktie that he intended to wear to court, and did
that necktie have a spot;' Yes.
Two: Did he intend for it to be the case that he appeared in court
wearing a spotted necktie? No.
We will call the first question and its answer de re, that is, pertaining to the thing, and the second de dicto, that is, pertaining to the
statement. The two assertions whose truth or falsehood we are considering may be put into logical form as follows:
De re: (3x) (Nx & Sx & Csx): There is an x such that x is a necktie, x
has a spot, and Sam intended to wear x to court.
De dicto: Isp: Sam intended to make true proposition p, the proposition that Sam appears in court wearing a necktie with a spot.
In this particular case, as we have seen, the de re statement is true
and the de dicto statement is false, and which statement we consider
the more important depends on what we want to know about Sam and
why.
With these alternative logical forms in hand, let us turn to our
twelve cases. Here is how I believe they should be analyzed:
1. The question here is whether Smith intentionally damaged the
property of his landlord. The de re answer, adopted by the trial court,
is that, yes, there is an x such that x is the property of the landlord,
and Smith intentionally damaged x. The de dicto answer, adopted by
the Court of Appeal, is that no he did not intentionally cause it to be
the case that his landlord's property was damaged. I suppose in a tort
case or an action to make the landlord return Smith's deposit I would
go for the de re answer because that answer would enable the landlord
to put the wall and the floor back and relet the flat. But I think the
Court of Appeal was right to choose the de dicto answer in the criminal
case, because that relates to Smith's subjective guilt.
2. The question here is whether Caddali entered the United
States for the purpose of marrying her American citizen fianc6. The
de re version adopted by the court was whether there was an x such
that x was an American citizen and her fiance, and she entered the
United States for the purpose of marrying x. Her version, the de dicto
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one, was whether she came for the purpose of making true the proposition that she married her fiance, an American citizen. If the existential assertion required by an affirmative answer to the de re version
refers to the present world, then the de reversion must be answered in
the negative. With the death of the fiance, it was no longer the case
that there was an x such that she came for the purpose of marrying x.
On the other hand, the de dictoversion continued to require an affirmative answer as long as she did not know her fianc6 was dead. Since
her purpose in entering the United States could not in any event be
accomplished, I suppose it makes sense to opt for the de reversion, as
both the INS and the Court of Appeals did.
3. De re: Is it the case that there is an x such that x is an act forbidden by a regulation and the trucker knowingly did x? Yes. De dicto: Is
it the case that the trucker knowingly made true the proposition that
he violated a regulation? No. The majority favored the de reversion of

the question, because it was only ignorance of the regulation that kept
the de dicto version from being true, and ignorance of the law is no
excuse. The dissenters, by opting for the de dicto version, treated an
administrative regulation differently from a statute. The case can be
seen, therefore, as one of those establishing the status of administrative regulations.
4. Under a de re interpretation of the Civil Rights Act, the defendants will be guilty if there is an x such that x is a right protected by the
federal Constitution, and the defendants knowingly violated x. Under
the de dicto interpretation, they will be guilty only if they knowingly
made true the proposition that they violated a right protected by the
federal Constitution. There is a point in the defendants' argument
that the de re interpretation makes the statute too vague to stand as
part of the criminal law. The court was right to save the statute, and
punish a particularly brutal abuse of power, by choosing the de dicto
version.
5. If we interpret the statute de re, we will ask if there was an x
such that x was an act of sexual intercourse, x was unlawful, and Chapman intended the girl to engage in x. Yes to all three, as the court
determined. The only serious issue was whether x was unlawful even if
not punishable, and the court decided that it was. But as Chapman
did not know that the nonmarital but nonpunishable act would be
considered unlawful, he did not intend to make true the proposition
that the girl had unlawful sexual intercourse. So on a de dicto interpretation of the statute he would have been acquitted. As he seems a
rather unpleasant sort of sexual predator, I am happy to go with the de
reinterpretation and agree with the court in finding him guilty. Interestingly enough, the defense put its entire effort into arguing that the
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intercourse was not unlawful, and never brought up the de dicto interpretation of the statute.
6. Suppose your client were to burn the letters at once. On the
one hand, it would not be the case that there is an x such that x is an
official proceeding or investigation, and your client intends to keep
the letters from being produced or used in x. On the other hand,
your client would intend to keep from being true the proposition that
the letters are produced or used in any official proceeding or investigation. Here the decision is a little difficult. Everything within the
scope of the de re interpretation is also within that of the de dicto, and
only the de dicto encompasses the full range of the policy concern behind the statute. On the other hand, the de dicto interpretation is
more intrusive, more subjective, and harder to administer. The prevailing view, I believe, opts for the de re interpretation, but gives a fairly
extensive scope to the existential "there is . . ." so as to include any

case where a proceeding or investigation is anticipated in the near
future as well as one where it is now going on. 10 This seems to be the
best approach to take.
7. This is the famous case of People v. Jaffe, decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in 1906. On a de dicto interpretation of the
applicable law, Jaffe would have been found guilty. He attempted to
make true the proposition that he bought stolen goods. But the
Court adopted the de reinterpretation and exonerated him. It was not
the case that there was an x such that x was stolen and he attempted to
purchase x. It seems too bad in a way to letJaffe off, but I suppose the
court is right not to punish people for bad attitudes when they have
not done anything wrong.
8. Here, most courts seem to adopt the de dicto interpretation. 1
The defendant attempted to make true the proposition that he stole
something from the victim's pocket, although it was not the case that
there was an x such that he attempted to steal x. This seems to be a
reasonable approach. By putting his hand in the victim's pocket, the
defendant has done something wrong that the police did not put him
up to. Furthermore, if we adopted the de re interpretation, we could
probably not convict a pickpocket even if there was something valuable in the pocket he was caught trying to pick. Unless he knew in
advance what he would find in the pocket, it would not be the case
that there was an x such that he was trying to steal x.
9. The plaintiff here invokes a de dicto version of the law of negligence: where the defendant's act creates an unreasonable risk of mak10
11

See CHARLEs W. WoLFRAM,MODERN LEGAL ETHics 643-44 (1986).
See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Larceny § 57 (1995).
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ing true the proposition that the plaintiff is harmed, and does make
true that proposition, the defendant is liable. This is the version Lord
Scrutton adopted in the Polemis case, 12 staple fare in most first-year
Torts classes. Later generations, led by the Privy Council in the Wagon
MVound13 case, have preferred the de reversion: the defendant is liable
if there is an x such that x is a harm to the plaintiff, the defendant's
act creates an unreasonable risk of x occurring, and x does occur. On
that version, of course, the defendant in our hand grenade case will
win. Despite my admiration for Scrutton, I think I go with the judges
who see the de re version as more in keeping with the idea of holding
people liable for the consequences of their negligence.
10. Cases like this come up often enough to be of more than
academic interest. Unfortunately, and I think quite wrongly, the
courts have almost always refused to convict defendants of rape in
these cases. 14 They apply a de re version of the applicable law. The
defendant is guilty of rape if and only if there is an x such that x is an
act of carnal knowledge of the victim by the defendant, and the victim
did not consent to x. I think this lets the defendant off too easily. I
would use a de dicto version. If the defendant made true the proposition that he had carnal knowledge of the victim-in this case, the
proposition that Richard had carnal knowledge ofJane-and she did
not consent to make true that proposition, then he is guilty of rape.
That this ought to be the law is borne out by many statutes making it
the law. Courts that have let defendants off have felt themselves to be
compelled by the logic of the rule they were applying. I do not believe they are so compelled.
11. The issue here is what is meant by intending to do what the
Church does. Leo interpreted the rule de re. The sacrament is valid
only if for every x, if the Church in administering the sacrament does
x, the minister intends to do x-or at least does not expressly exclude
the intent to do x. Since one of the things the church does in ordaining priests is confer the power to offer the sacrifice of the Mass,
and the first generation of Anglican prelates expressly excluded the
intention to do that, their ordinations were invalid. The Anglicans
responded with a de dicto interpretation. The sacrament is valid if the
minister intends to make true the proposition that he does what the
church does. The language in the Prayer Book about continuity
12 In reAn Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B.
560 (C.A.).
13 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., 1961 App. Cas. 388

(P.C.).
14 See B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Rape by Fraudor Impersonation,91 A.L.R. 2D 591
(1963).
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makes clear that the authors had that intention. I think I am with the
Anglicans here in preferring the de dicto version. The de re version
offers too many ways an ill-instructed or unorthodox minister can produce invalid sacraments.
12. This case requires a more complicated analysis than the
others. The rabbis condemned in the Gospel passage evidently found
themselves logically compelled by the following argument:
Everything the owner says is dedicated to the Temple is in fact so
dedicated.
Nothing dedicated to the Temple is available for parental support.
Joe says that everything he owns that is available for parental support (and nothing else that he owns) is dedicated to the Temple.
Therefore, nothing that he owns is either dedicated to the Temple
or available for parental support.
The argument is fallacious because the first premise is true only if
interpreted de re, whereas the third is true only if interpreted de dicto.
That is, it may be true that for every x if the owner of x says that x is
dedicated to the Temple, then x is so dedicated, but that does not
mean that to utter a proposition about dedication is to make it true,
especially where it refers to an empty class. But uttering such a proposition is all that the third premise of the argument claims thatJoe has
done. It is not the case that there is an x such that x is available to
supportJoe's parents and Joe has said that x is dedicated to the Temple. So the first premise, rightly understood, does not refer to anything that the third premise refers to, the premises between them do
not support the conclusion, and Joe had better get busy supporting
his parents.
Having gone through this collection of examples, we are ready to
consider the major question before us: what is the use of analysis of
this kind? I believe the examples show that it is useful in several ways.
First, as in the rape case and the case of the undutiful son, there are
people who find themselves logically compelled to intuitively bad results, or, as in the case of the empty pocket, intuitively compelled to
what seem illogical results. By showing that the de re and de dicto alternatives have equal claim to logical support, the analysis makes it possible to embrace the intuitively right result with no logical qualms.
Second, in cases such as the one involving the transportation of corrosives, where the intuitive judgment is less than clear, the analysis
stands in the way of using an appeal to logic to avoid the necessity of
making a hard decision and taking responsibility for it. Finally, some
cases actually do turn on the meanings of words and sentences or the
logical form in which rules are couched or questions put. In such
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cases, it often turns out that one side is relying on a de re interpretation, the other on a de dicto one, so that it becomes impossible to reduce the matter at issue to a clear question that a decisionmaker can
answer one way or the other. In 1310, in a complicated case involving
responsibility for feudal dues, Chief Justice Bereford of the Court of
Common Pleas reproached the lawyers, saying, "Get to your business.
You plead about one point, they about another, so that neither of you
strikes the other. '15 I think there are cases in which this analysis will
enable a few lawyers to get to their business.

15 Abbot of Hartland v. Beaupel, Y.B. 3 Edw. 2, Trin. (1310), reprinted in 20 SELSOCIETY 164, 169 (1905).

DEN

